I work at the intersection of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind and epistemology. I am particularly interested in his relationship to skepticism and in his rejection of materialist conceptions of the mind and soul. More generally, I am interested in the continuities and discontinuities between ancient and modern conceptions of mind, body, and world.
Publications
- ‘Soul and Body in Aristotle’s Theory of Perception.” Forthcoming at Journal of the History of Philosophy.
- ‘Aristotle on Perceptual Self-Consciousness.’ Forthcoming at Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
Works in Progress
- ‘Discrimination and Judgment in Aristotle.’ [Draft available] Argues that Aristotle understands perception as a power of judgment or discrimination because he understands the senses as criteria or canons relative to which we can authoritatively judge that something is e.g. pale or dark, sweet or bitter.
Dissertation
Spontaneous Activity and Truthfulness in Aristotle’s Theory of Perception
Aristotle maintains that perception is a form of truthful cognition or knowledge (gnôsis). My dissertation argues that it amounts to a form of knowledge precisely insofar as it involves a spontaneous, judgment-like act in which we identify something for what it is by distinguishing it from what it is not. In doing so, I push back against the widespread view that perceptual knowledge, for Aristotle, is a matter of being accurately appeared-to, a simple ‘match’ or ‘fit’ between ‘inner appearance’ and ‘outer reality.’ Some feel compelled to attribute such a ‘passive’ conception of perceptual knowledge to Aristotle because they consider the Aristotelian soul a perceiver’s capacity for passive phenomenal awareness. I show that on the contrary, it is a principle of spontaneous activity.
This reappraisal of the soul’s role in perception promises to reshape our understanding of why Aristotle rejects materialist theories of cognition. Aristotle’s anti-materialism is generally taken for a rejection of a ‘reductive’ or ‘eliminative’ conception of ‘the mental’ in the attempt to make space for phenomenal awareness in an otherwise material universe. My dissertation suggests that Aristotle’s real target is a “colliding billiard balls” picture of reality according to which the world is exhausted by bodies in mechanical motion and nothing acts spontaneously, or from within. From Aristotle’s perspective, this materialist view cannot accommodate the essentially teleological or end-directed nature of cognition, or the fact that cognitive subjects get things right or wrong. What is at stake in Aristotle’s confrontation with materialism is not phenomenal consciousness, but normativity.
Conference Papers
- “Aristotle on Perceptual Self-Consciousness.” A symposium session for the January 2025 American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting in New York City.
- “Discrimination and Judgment in Aristotle.” Presented at The Fifth Annual Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, April 2024.
- ‘Aristotle on Perception and Time: De sensu 448a26–30.’ A colloquium paper from the February 2023 A.P.A. Central Division Meeting in Denver.
- ‘Pleasure and Perception in Aristotle’s De anima 3.7.’ A symposium paper from the January 2023 A.P.A. Eastern Division Meeting in Montreal.
Joshua Trubowitz 